NONKILLING SECURITY & THE STATE

Edited by
Joám Evans Pim

Foreword by
Stephen M. Younger

Introduction by
Chaiwat Satha-Anand

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Center *for* Global **Nonkilling**

3653 Tantalus Drive
Honolulu, Hawai'i 96822-5033
United States of America
Email: info@nonkilling.org
http://www.nonkilling.org

Creighton UNIVERSITY
ASIAN WORLD CENTER

Becker Hall Suite G25
2500 California Plaza
Omaha, Nebraska 68178 USA
Email: asianworldcenter@creighton.edu
www.creighton.edu/ccas/asianworldcenter

In memoriam
Robert Muller
(1923-2010)

Contents

The Role of UCAV, PGM, Nonlethal Weaponry and Cyber Policing

Transitioning from an Armed to an Unarmed Peace under UN Supervision [*]

Klaus Schlichtmann
Nihon University

A hairbreadth difference and heaven and earth are set apart. (Chinese proverb)

The UN Charter provides for setting up a System of Collective Security; it also envisages a transition from the present state of an armed to an unarmed peace, during which the five Permanent Members will assume the responsibility to see the transition through (Schlichtmann, 2011). In the projected end-stage all nations would have disarmed to the minimum stipulated in Article 26 of the UN Charter, while permitting "each government to maintain adequate land forces to police its territory and defend its frontiers" (Wright, 1942: 279). Members one by one, according to the rule of reciprocity, will have agreed to confer "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" on the Security Council and signed a World Disarmament Pact, in fulfillment of Article VI of the NPT and the numerous resolutions passed in the General Assembly, calling for "general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." The Charter would have to be thoroughly reviewed in the process. Closely related to the issue of the transition, such a Review Conference was envisaged in the UN Charter and scheduled to have taken place during the first ten years of the UN's existence, intended to kick off or facilitate the process. During the transition, accompanied by active NGO and civil society support and input, the United Nations should develop into a world authority endowed with limited but adequate law-making, judicial and executive powers to maintain and defend peace as well as ensure the development and ecological equilibrium and advancement of the planet and its

[*] Reworked version of a paper presented at the 2012 IPRA Conference, Japan. UCAV: Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles; PGM: Precision-Guided Munitions.

people as a whole. The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) with its state of the art new weapons systems (Müller and Schörnig, 2010) such as Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV), Precision Guided Missiles (PGM), nonlethal weaponry, and cyber policing may provide the necessary powerful instruments to effectively back the transition process and secure safe passage while avoiding civilian casualties and bloodletting.

In my presentation I have relied heavily on Robert Mandel's book *Security, Strategy, and the Quest for Bloodless War* (and his sources) as well as Glenn Paige's (2009) *Nonkilling Global Political Science*. Mandel's book in many respects relates to Glenn Paige's nonkilling paradigm. The "quest for bloodless war," Robert Mandel writes, "has raised absolutely central security and strategy issues, particularly in light of the changing post-Cold War international context." (Mandel, 2004: x) I will put these issues and concerns in the context of the UN Charter provisions for securing safe passage during the transition from an armed to an unarmed peace which the Charter envisages.

Motivations and Means

> *The unanswered questions surrounding the quest for bloodless war connect directly to profound questions about both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the use of force in the current disorderly global system* (Mandel, 2004: x).

The three most important and frequently applied means of enforcement that can minimize the shedding of blood are precision-guided munitions (PGM), nonlethal weaponry, and cyber engagement (policing). Cyber engagement, combined with peace and development education, could become the linchpin of peacekeeping in the 21st century. Enforcement action that avoids "human harm … without a drop of blood spilled" is the future, and to some "the ultimate political … fantasy." Today's technological advances promise enforcement powers that would "make that age-old dream a reality," and "substantial resources to promote strategies to accelerate its pursuit" are assigned to it. (Mandel, 2004: 1) The "idea of actually being able to impose one's will" and enforce common world law "around the globe without significant human costs" is intriguing and is gaining ground.

> In evaluating modern war, human rights groups, the press, and the public often look to the number of dead and wounded civilians as a meaningful metric. Civilian casualty figures sometimes are used to assess the morality, effectiveness, or legitimacy of military intervention (Project on the means of Intervention, 2002: 2).

Casualty minimization could be a "yardstick for success" (Mandel) in law enforcement action. The "pace of innovation in military technology" (Mandel, 2004: 19) is gaining speed: "The unprecedented carnage of 19th-centtury warfare led … nations to try to mitigate the most unnecessary forms of battlefield suffering" because "innovations in weaponry and the advent of 'total war', which exacted unconditional surrender from the defeated party, had made combat deadlier than ever before" (Greenberg, 2001). According to a report by the humanitarian organization Save the Children "the percentage of civilians killed and wounded as a result of hostilities has risen from five percent of all casualties at the turn of the last century to 65 percent during World War II to 90 percent in more recent conflicts" (Correll, 2003: 51-52). The fact can hardly be overstated that "the barbarism of any period pales before the barbarism of today" (Fuller, 1998 [1945]: ix). Indeed, "there has been continuous, rapid growth in the reach, lethality, speed, and information-gathering potential of armies" (Biddle, 2002: 107) since the Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907 first attempted to abolish war. Nonetheless, and for that very reason, at the same time the aim was to enable belligerents to fight wars avoiding excessive loss of blood. Naturally,

> [a]ll nations with any degree of responsiveness to their citizens are casualty averse, but wealthy democratic countries have acquired a particularly low political tolerance in this area; their political elites can be said to be risk averse in regard to war casualties (Eikenberry, 1996: 13).

The "bloody record of interstate violence" shows that "84 percent of all military and civilian deaths caused by war since 1700" happened in the twentieth century, during which period also "the quest for bloodless war accelerated dramatically" (Mandel, 2004: 27). As Paige has pointed out,

> at some point in history humans must simply refuse to kill and to cooperate with systems that kill. Otherwise cycles of lethality between vengeful vanquished and traumatized victors will continue ... in retrospect twentieth century atrocities show that late nineteenth century peace advocates who sought to abolish war were completely correct. There is a clear connection among atrocities from World War I to World War II to the Cold War and beyond (Paige, 2009: 95).

The two World Wars "induced foreign security policymakers all over the world to think seriously about the casualty issue," (Mandel, 2004: 28) and—omitted by Mandel—the abolition and outlawry of war. The movement in the

interwar period to make going to war an international crime (Wehberg, 1931) resulted in both the prohibition of the threat and use of force in the UN Charter as well as Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which states:

> (1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. (2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

A number of constitutions pursue similar aims.[1]

Obviously, the prime motivation for introducing nonkilling technologies is noble since it is based on humanitarian concerns, "attempting to reduce death and severe injury among noncombatants, who have inadvertently become more common victims of warfare due to the increased destructive power of many modem lethal weapons technologies" (Mandel, 2004: 103). Making enforcement action in effect less fatal and painful, "[i]ts hallmarks are speed, maneuver, flexibility, and surprise. It is heavily reliant on precision firepower, special forces, and psychological operations" (Boot, 2003: 42).

> Several definitional problems are readily apparent. Is a small explosive charge designed for contained demolition of structures and detonated far from known human populations a nonlethal weapon? Is it proper to classify a foam barrier as a weapon at all? How can one discuss the level of damage beneath which a weapon would properly be classified as nonlethal? The context may be critical in determining nonlethality. (Mandel, 2004: 101) Biological or chemical agents that destroy crops without directly affecting people would still be considered lethal if starvation is the likely result; a microwave weapon that disables a truck that subsequently drives off a cliff, killing the driver, would be nonlethal [while] the same weapon used against a helicopter in flight would have to be considered lethal (Cook, Fiely and McGowan, 1997).

Perhaps not surprisingly, throughout the book, Mandel's arguments are based on the assumption that war is still an option, in spite of the fact that the UN Charter explicitly prohibits the threat and use of force. I will therefore use the term 'enforcement action' or 'policing' where Mandel uses 'war', and 'lawbreaker' or 'assailant' instead or 'enemy'. Nevertheless, the importance

[1] See list online at <http://www.unfor.info/liste24list_en.html>.

of the quest for bloodless war to overall international security should not be underestimated, and Mandel's book points in the right direction.

Regrettably, in view of the ineffectiveness of the United Nations Security System, the USA has traditionally assumed responsibility for enforcing international peace and security in parts of the world, however, apparently with little success (for example if we think of the Vietnam and Iraq wars) and only if it suited its national interest, which is in many respects detrimental to the cause of peace and security.

Instead, Members are under obligation to replace the current set-up still based on the crumbling Westphalian nation-state system, by embarking upon the transition envisaged in the UN Charter, which calls for setting up a workable system of collective security and abolishing war. The necessity to accomplish this had become evident already more than a hundred years ago at the Peace Conferences in The Hague, to which the Russian Czar and the Dutch Queen Wilhelmina had invited. (Schlichtmann, 2003) Historically no doubt the Europeans are largely responsible for this situation still continuing; it is they above all who are legally bound and under obligation to take steps to empower the UN. Empowering the UN would provide a nonkilling perspective that could be "absorbed or integrated" in its "old structures." However, while this would probably be more easily accomplished than other options, some people may prefer a "restructuring [of] the old … [and/or] establishment of parallel transitional institutions, or … creation of completely new or hybrid institutions combining every source of strength for full-force pursuit of nonkilling transformation." (Paige, 2009: 114).

According to analysts casualty aversion can be achieved in a number of ways, i.e. "some focus on the type of target or initiator, others on the form of weapon, and still others on the nature of the military confrontation." Robert Mandel lists "four major clusters of approaches" for minimizing casualties: "banning destructive military action, limiting warfare participants, minimizing civilian exposure to harm, and preventing attack initiation." These are considered among "the most idealistic set of approaches to casualty aversion ... [s]ome quite feasible and widely used … others … relatively infeasible and quite rare" (Mandel, 2004: 45-46).

With regard to banning destructive military action Mandel names "[t]wo distinct possibilities," i.e. "inducing disarmament to reduce the devastation resulting from conflict," and a rather old-fashioned "possibility" that has, however, proved ineffective in most instances in the past (Brandt, 1988), i.e. "making the rules of war more stringent and enhancing their enforcement to lessen the carnage that occurs during warfare" (Mandel, 2004: 46). What should ac-

tually be made "more stringent" are not the rules of war but the rule of law. However, the author quite correctly observes that "key obstacles immediately rise to the surface. The first approach violates what appears to be an inexorable pattern across human history of accelerated weapons development and bloody warfare, and the second approach cannot function in an anarchic international system devoid of shared global norms and values on how war should be conducted" (Mandel 2004: 47). In other words,

> the most idealistic approaches—initiating disarmament and expanding and enforcing the rules of war [rule of law]—would be incredibly well suited to minimize loss of life where it not for their complete infeasibility in today's anarchic international system (Mandel, 2004: 64-65).

R. Mandel falls short of the ways and means envisaged in the UN Charter, however, when he states: "Although possible ways certainly exist to move in these directions, such as increased sanctions against genocide or increased efforts to dismantle weapons of mass destruction, generally the feasibility of using this cluster [i.e. Banning Destructive Military Action] of strategies to minimize loss of life is extremely low" (Mandel, 2004: 47).

Yet crisis is chance. One way to escape the predicament of the present anarchic international system is a to establish a universal "Shanti Sena" (Soldiers of Peace) or "Peace Corps," a Gandhian concept (Paige, 2009: 116; Bhave, 1963; Weber, 1996; Ramachandran, 1984; Radhakrishnan, 1992). Ideally, the transition to nonkilling societies would involve "creation of a nonkilling student community service corps as an alternative to military training" (Paige, 2009: 116). Governments themselves should be called upon to set up a Peace and Disarmament Ministry and organize nonviolent, nonkilling Soldiers of Peace as "a disciplined, distinctively identifiable force whose members are trained for nonkilling conflict resolution and reconciliation, community security and civilian defense, paramedical lifesaving, disaster relief, and constructive service in response to community needs" (Paige, 2009: 116). In this way the existing military institutions could be transformed and become constructive peace-building and enforcing agencies starting with the Blue Helmets and the Japanese Jieitai (Self-Defense Forces—SDF) which are prohibited to use weapons on PKO missions. In fact they are already, apart from their designation of defending the country's territory, geared toward becoming a nonkilling international peace force. The fundamental difference between police and military action is that policemen have to account for the dead/casualties while the military does not, (Koppe, 2002) and one gets a medal for killing as many 'enemies' as possible.

Precision-Guided Munitions, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Robots

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) "have been around for the last 40 years," and have been vital for enforcement action in Afghanistan and elsewhere, but it is only quite recently that they have been "aggressively pursued and developed as vital tools" for use in enforcement action ("military operations"). (Rocha, 1997) However, the remotely controlled UAVs used so far have certain limitations, which is why the development of autonomously-piloted vehicles has been much sought after. But "the technology required is still out of reach," although it has been "advocated for years"—the problem being that the technology "require[s] a computer that could 'think' and that would be asked to make life-and-death decisions on the battlefield," (Record, 2000: 21-22) a virtual impossibility.

Largely mechanized or robotic armed forces have become a common feature in science fiction movies depicting future wars. "Once science fiction, today the robots and the attack laser are fact" (Pugliese, 1998). In the future "robotic weapons will be used increasingly," and such conflicts "as can take place without soldiers" (Luttwak, 1994: 27) are likely to play a prominent role. Predominant are "robotic soldiers and unmanned vehicles," which in enforcement action could avoid putting UN Blue Helmets in harms way.

Apart from unmanned aerial vehicles, precision-guided munitions (PGMs) have been given much attention and publicity. "Buttressed by the unprecedented accuracy evidenced in the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, many onlookers are proclaiming that the basic nature of violent conflict itself has changed. Combining the humanitarian potential to minimize collateral damage and civilian casualties with the efficiency potential to minimize the number of bombs dropped necessary to hit vital targets, on the surface there appears to be no downside to this development." (Mandel, 2004: 67) The potential change regarding the basic nature of violent conflict seems promising and it is this decision makers need to focus on. Employing PGMs continues to be the preferred option, as it can demonstrate policy makers' "political sensitivity and sophistication" likely to be "appreciated around the world," (Gresham, 1999); and appeasing "public distaste for harming innocents" (Mandel, 2004: 75).

However, "the long-term political and psychological premises behind the development of precision-guided munitions" are complex (Mandel, 2004: 74). In any case, policy makers want to avoid the problems posed by the still remaining "collateral damage and casualties generated by unguided weapons" (Gresham, 1999).

> In recent decades, technologies have been used both to minimize U.S. casualties and to counter accusations that the United States does not care about adversary civilian suffering. One answer to North Vietnam's attempt to exploit collateral damage was the U.S. introduction of more-advanced precision-guided munitions against targets likely to draw harmful propaganda, such as air defense sites in populated areas. When striking terrorist camps in Afghanistan in 1998, the United States used cruise missiles, in part because they posed no threat to U.S. personnel, even though a manned-flight bombing mission could have inflicted greater damage on the terrorist training camps that the United States sought to destroy (Byman and Waxman, 2001: 231-232).

The dilemma is that the US is not the world's policeman and does not represent a global constituency like the UN does. What is needed is to implement the pertinent UN Charter stipulations, including those that provide for policing by air. Political scientist Ralph Goldman stresses the need for the world's "military institutions [to be] converted from competing armies into instruments of internal order and safety ... centralized under civilian control" (Goldman 1982: 122). These as yet unrealized stipulations were developed in the interwar period and supported by people like the British parliamentarian David Davies and H.G. Wells, among others. Besides giving the navy a role in policing the seas, the UN Charter envisages an international air force "as the 'policeman' of the world" (Davies, 1930: 441; Davies, 1945: 82 ff.; Wells, 1908; Schlichtmann, 2007). "The hard fact remains," Davies resumes, that "until the international police are ushered on to the stage, mankind will again be compelled to pass through the valley of bitter experience before it finally resolves to organize its forces" (Davies, 1930: 430). It is high time to take legislative action to achieve the purposes of the United Nations Organization.

Nonlethal Weapons

The perception among the public regarding nonlethal weaponry used in enforcing peace so far has been minimal, yet it is "increasingly becoming available for widespread application" (Mandel, 2004: 99) in defense and to further national and by implication international security. While traditional security policy measures comprise diplomacy, economic sanctions and finally, if and when international peace and security are threatened, enforcement action sanctioned by the UN Security Council, nonlethal weaponry presents something of an alternative "middle option" (Garwin and Winfield, 1999: vii).

"Research on nonlethal weapons for police and military use has been undertaken in the United States at least since 1965, and accelerated in the 1990s" (Paige, 2009: 100). The U.S. Defense Department describes nonlethal

weaponry as "weapons that are explicitly designed to and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel and materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment … unlike conventional lethal weapons that destroy their targets principally through blast, penetration, and fragmentation, nonlethal weapons employ means other than gross physical destruction to prevent the target from functioning" (Mandel, 2004: 101-102). Evidently, nonlethal weaponry provides an option of choice during enforcement action, thus increasing the "number of options available to commanders confronting situations in which the use of deadly force poses problems" (Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program, 1998: 2-3), or is vetoed—in the event of the transition in progress.

Nonkilling political scientist Glenn D. Paige counts among nonlethal weapons of law enforcement a "wide range of technologies … including laser, optical, acoustical, electromagnetic pulse, chemical, biological, and dozens of other weapons." And "the range of specific nonlethal security instruments is broad and constantly evolving … including such coercive techniques as blunt projectiles, tear gas, traction modifiers, nets or rapid-hardening rigid foam, radio frequency or microwave technologies, noxious smells, and acoustical interference." R. Mandel also gives a 'more colloquial' enumeration, i.e. "slickums, stickums, super acids, goop guns, blinding non-nuclear electromagnetic pulses, high power microwaves, laser weapons, infrasound, computer viruses, and metal-eating microbes" (Mandel, 2004: 101-102). Several of these instruments are already "regarded as a complement to conventional lethal capabilities," and the "fact that nonkilling alternatives are being taken seriously by traditional experts in violent security should encourage no less serious and even more advanced comprehensive efforts by political science" (Paige, 2009: 100). The United Nations' aim of a transition to collective security and a 'minimum' disarmed state corresponds to and provides the legal groundwork for realizing the objective posited by Glenn Paige of a "*transition* to completely nonkilling security conditions" (Paige, ibid.). The establishment of a working system of collective security in particular which has been called for many times in the past, deserves renewed attention.

> When the League of Nations and the United Nations were created, the political leaders of the world were in effect acknowledging that unilateral 'national security' could no longer provide the full measure of safety that it had in previous times. Weapons had become too destructive, alliance systems too unreliable. 'Collective security' became a significant concept following World War I. It was written into the United Nations Charter with a degree of explicitness never before achieved in an international agree-

> ment. However, a working system of international collective security has yet to become operative. 'Peacekeeping', with its special contemporary meanings, has become a replacement concept describing what the United Nations undertakes in the security field. For the most part, though, unilateral approaches to national security remain as the predominant technique for achieving national safety. The political leader who speaks of 'national security' usually refers to the assumption that his nation has the primary responsibility for its self-defense (Goldman 1982: 124).

Interestingly, although the author (Mandel) admits that his book's "focus is on wartime casualty aversion," he highlights a fifth purpose of nonlethal weapons, i.e. to "improve the effectiveness" of peacekeeping operations: "Many advocates of non-lethal weapons point to the growth of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations where new military force structures are evidently needed but where, at present, effective alternative non-lethal weapons systems are not available" (Lewer and Schofield, 1997: 128). Again, Mandel finds "nonlethal weaponry … very much in tune with the aims of peacekeeping, where the consent of those involved is critical" (Mandel, 2004: 105-106). In the event of the Charter transition having been embarked upon, a consensus among the "P5" is required for enforcement action.

Figure 1. Classificantion of Nonlethal Weaponry

Defensive disabling access denial functions	***Conterpersonnel nonlethal measures***
Traction	**Blunt or soft projectiles**
Goop ejectors	**Stinger grenades**
Trapping nets	**Stun guns**
Rapid-hardening rigid foam	**Tear gas**
Offensive enabling combat support functions	**Pepper spray**
Blunt or soft projectiles	**Noxious smells**
Stinger grenades	**Blinding laser weapons**
Super acids	**Acoustical interference**
Metal-eating microbes	***Countermatériel nonlethal measures***
Both	**Traction modifiers**
Tear gas	**Electromagnetic pulses**
Pepper spray	**Super acids**
Blinding laser weapons	**Metal-eating microbes**
Stun guns	***Both***
Noxious smells	**Goop guns**
Acoustical interference	**Trapping nets**
Microwave technologies	**Rapid-hardening rigid foam**
Electromagnetic pulses	**Microwave technologies**

Source: Mandel (2004: 102).

Intrinsically this novel tool brings up "many fascinating and important questions about the effective ways of fighting and managing conflict in today's world," e.g. to what extent nonlethal weapons are able "to advance the cause of casualty aversion on a global level." Obviously, "since nonlethal weaponry has been used more in nonwar situations within states, employing it in violent international conflicts is still something of a novelty." A new thinking is required. "Fundamental underlying issues … about the nature of weaponry, the military, and even warfare itself" (Mandel, 2004: 105-106) have to be addressed and brought to a new level and understanding.

Cyber Policing, Information Policies and Peace and Development Education

As Robert Mandel has pointed out, "[c]ompared to the other principal instruments of the quest for bloodless war," cyber warfare—or better: cyber policing—is "distinctive in a couple of ways." The first reason he gives is that the instruments have been "subject to the most rapid change and most speedy global diffusion." Furthermore, "the way in which this approach contributes to casualty aversion is considerably subtler than the methods of the other instruments" (Mandel, 2004: 127). It is likely that added content about peace and development would broaden the scope and enhance the effectiveness of this instrument.

One of the aims of information 'warfare' is to prevent attack initiation. Preventing attack initiation provides two options:

> (1) incapacitating or modifying enemy information systems through the use of disruptive techniques and psychological operations that interfere with or alter a target's command-and-control capabilities over its own armed forces (in place of taking enemy troops out directly); and (2) strengthening military deterrence by increasing one's military capabilities and resolve (and possibly shows-of-force) to such a degree that one's superior capacity [Comment: of UN forces in the event of general and complete disarmament actually being carried out] and will to inflict damage is absolutely unambiguous and credible to all potential adversaries. (Mandel, 2004: 50)

Preventing aggression and armed attack in violation of international law and disarmament agreements (World Disarmament Pact) is also a matter of education, and greatly depends on support by an informed and participating public.

Robert Mandel's assertion that it is "conceptually possible that some new means may develop in the future to allow a state to communicate superiority of overall power and the futility of resistance in some limited circumstances even to highly passionate or irrational targets" is questionable,

since foreseeably only a strengthened and empowered world body could ever succeed to accomplish this.

The author rightly asserts that it would be preferable if "the international spread of moral education could make deterrence more effective without substantial loss of life." The attainable aim is "to induce others to change behavior" (Mandel, 2004: 52). This of course could be provided by an effective global system ensuring distributive justice and equal prospects for all. There can be no doubt, however, that a paradigm shift is required and in the making, seeing that the Westphalian nation-state system is no longer adequate to deal with globalization and complex global emergencies,[2] and since it is not possible to "[s]trengthen … military deterrence" while at the same time "engaging in unilateral disarmament" (Mandel, 2004: 53) New rules of war which "are mere attempts to update an already obsolete international regime" are not the solution since they "neither appreciate, nor respond to, the enormity of the challenge before us: to create new and viable laws of conflict that represent a modern, sentient, and moral response to the human condition known as war" (Allenby and Mattick, 2012). Glenn Paige emphasizes the required paradigm shift: "Methodologically a nonkilling shift challenges new thinking in methods for research, education, applied politics, and institution-building." (Paige, 2009: 83)

Effects—Purposes—Accomplishments

> *A contemporary slogan holds that there will be 'no peace without justice'—implying that violence and war will continue or be necessary to protest or change unjust conditions. But from a nonkilling perspective there will be 'no justice without nonkilling'. For killing and threats to kill have contributed to the creation and maintenance of injustice* (Paige, 2009: 133).

PGMs, nonlethal weaponry, and cyber systems can be "mutually supportive" and are frequently "tightly interconnected." As Mandel has pointed out: "A few examples of the extensive cross-linkages help to illustrate this claim: nonlethal weaponry could serve as part of information warfare to disrupt an electronic command-and-control system; precision-guided munitions could help direct nonlethal technologies to their designated targets." Cyber-informing

[2] See "Perception of the Global Emergency: the Eight Great Dangers," available online at <http://www.unfor.info/the_reversal_of_tendencies.htm>.

the party, country or group planning or about to launch an attack in violation of international law could have a huge psychological impact, for example by amplifying the disastrous effect precision-guided munitions would have, if the attack was not called off. This would greatly "increase the chances that these foes will lay down their arms" (Mandel, 2004: 53) sooner rather than later.

As Glenn Paige has pointed out, a step in the right direction would be the "emergence of nonkilling political parties that participate in need-responsive processes of societal problem-solving for the well-being of all." In Germany the leftist party *Die Linken* may be moving in this direction. Thus in due course nonkilling parties could "contribute to the realization of nonkilling societies, locally and globally" (Paige, 2009: 118). Already special departments may be created to gather data for "statistics on nonkilling …make periodic status reports … [and] recommendations to governmental decision-makers and to members of civil society..." (Paige, 2009: 119).

Precision-Guided Munitions

With the new Precision-Guided weapons systems it has become possible "to discriminate better among targets" (Mandel, 2004: 19). Both the law-breaking assailant and the law enforcement agency (Meilinger, 2001: 78-79) would benefit from the use of precision weaponry and "reduce harm to both" (Mandel, 2004: 75) while inspiring public "confidence" in (future) UN policymakers who may have to decide to use force in situations where collateral damage may be an issue and could be "either unacceptable or call into question the viability of continued … action" (Hallion, 1995: 77). Not surprisingly, however, "of the 85,000 tons of bombs used in the Gulf War, only 8,000 tons (less than 10%) were PGMs, yet they accounted for 75 percent of the damage" (CNN News, 2001, in Mandel, 2004: 79).

A notable advantage of using precision weaponry is its low cost. As Mandel has cited, compared to the price of a Tomahawk cruise missile, which was "the primary precision weapon in the Gulf War," costing more than $1 million each, "the price of the primary precision weapon in Afghanistan, the joint direct attack munition, was just $18,000 for a kit that used a global positioning satellite system to convert a dumb bomb into a smart one" (Mandel, 2004: 83; Kelly, 2002: 16). Indeed, "rather than being part of an unrealistic pipedream," and "[i]n sharp contrast to skepticism and opposition to this kind of idea in decades past, there appears now to be growing acceptance that robots are an inevitable—and potentially lifesaving—component of fighting forces of the future" (Mandel, 2004: 59).

Already "the use of UAVs may in some ways make foreign military intervention look more like police action than part of a formal war." (Mandel, 2004: 59) There is a clue here suggesting that this new trend in modern technology supports and enhances the transition from the nation-state sponsored war-system to an effective system of collective security where all nations will have disarmed to the minimum stipulated in Article 26 of the UN Charter.

While modern air enforcement using precision-guided munitions can project "an increasingly efficient, effective, and humane tool of foreign policy," (Meilinger, 2001: 78-79) criticism has been that although "PGMs make it possible for fewer aircraft to destroy more targets than in the past … this enhanced efficiency makes little difference to the coercive effectiveness" of a whole variety of lethal enforcement strategies: "Bombing knocked out nearly all power generation in North Korea (90 percent). North Vietnam (85-90 percent), and Iraq (over 90 percent), but in no case caused the population to rise up against the regime. ... [I]f modern nation-states can withstand so much, they will not give in under the relatively bloodless harassment envisioned by today's [precision] strategic bombing advocates" (Pape, 1996: 319-320).

Nonlethal Weapons

Harvey M. Sapolsky and Jeremy Shapiro have insisted:

> Killing, even remotely or robotically, is what we want to avoid as much as possible. From this realization springs the growing interest in nonlethal weapons. Dozens of goos, sprays, traps, and noisemakers are being developed to disable enemy equipment and personnel. In this kit, we hope, is (or will be soon) just the alternative we need for those times when a lethal encounter is undesirable (Sapolsky and Shaopiro, 1996: 119-127).

Obviously these weapons are expressly media-friendly. Thus the positive image presented to the outside world, in a (future) situation where a unanimous decision of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council to initiate enforcement action has been reached, would ensure public support, including from civil society organizations and actors, whose input and active participation will also be sought in the process. Peace researchers, nonkilling political scientists and civil society movements have to take into account and understand that nonlethal weapons provide decision-makers with a new, legitimate instrument for resolving complex political situations. If in peacekeeping operations "work to conduct humanitarian assistance could be overshadowed if because of circumstances deadly force must be applied," nonlethal technologies would "provide a means for precluding

such deadly confrontations." At the same time it would deny the adversary "the opportunity to exploit them for propaganda purposes," (Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program, 1999: 2) and "reduce the chances for the creation of martyrs," which aggressive groups or parties may wish to exploit for their own aggressive purposes. Still, noncombatant casualties are bound to occur, in spite of the fact that "they are immediately and graphically reported worldwide by networked media organizations." Obviously these reports can create "considerable local, international, or domestic … opposition," causing "loss of perceived legitimacy and severely limit[ing] the utility of military force as a policy option ... Clever opponents are quick to recognize these constraints and will seek to turn the situation to their own advantage" (Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program, 1998). Nonlethal weaponry employed by UN forces and "positively motivated" great powers (if there is such a thing) is likely to "circumvent this predicament," (Mandel, 2004: 104) especially if general and comprehensive disarmament is in the process of being implemented.

Cyber Policing, Information Policies and Peace and Development Education

> *The current sophisticated level of propaganda and database penetration systems outstrips the capacity of those with vulnerable systems to protect them, and so the feasibility of this approach is quite high. If accomplished successfully, the potential to save allied and enemy civilian and military lives is quite significant..."* (Mandel, 2004: 50).

As I have already indicated this category should be broadened to include general peace and development education, implicating the media, the internet, educational institutions, schools and universities as well as government-affiliated agencies. As Paige has repeatedly pointed out, "political science education must become a significant contributor to nonkilling global change" (Paige, 2009: 82).

> Nonkilling political science training will require extraordinary self-knowledge among participants ... Nonkilling political scientists should seek mutually supportive lifetime advancement, personally and collegially, in expressing profound respect for life, however diverse we may be in other matters. These needs do not differ from those of all other members of society. [...] The contributions of political scientists to nonkilling societies should become no less important than those of medical professionals for individual and public health. They both share life and death concern for the importance of diagnosis, prescription, and treatment based upon the best new knowledge. At the same time, *every member of society can become a contributor to nonkilling global transformation*. The educational task of nonkilling political science is to offer each participant-colleague at every level

> opportunities for personal development, and acquisition of knowledge and skills that will assist life-time amplification of nonkilling leadership and citizenship. All teach; all learn (Paige, 2009: 90, 82).

Peace activist and author Andrew Greig has declared a similar objective: "Education is probably one of our most powerful tools. If we educate our children and young adults about peace issues, we will be building a community for the future that will be much better informed about peace than today's generation." Referring to Stuart Rees, the Director of the Sydney Peace Foundation and Emeritus Professor at the University of Sydney's Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, he calls for "literacy about non-violence," (Rees, 2003: 160) asserting the necessity "to make peace studies a compulsory part of the school curriculum from early grades" (Greig, 2007: 258).

> An introductory course or core seminar should confront participants vividly with the most horrific evidence of historical and contemporary human capacity for lethality that can be presented. Together we then confront a lifelong challenge: the task of our discipline is to contribute to the end of human killing. A second educational experience should introduce just as vividly global evidence for nonkilling human potential. A third component introduces individual and social transformations and oscillations. The fourth core experience reviews human inventiveness in devising political institutions for desirable societies and challenges creativity in envisioning characteristics of killing-free societies and possible ways in which political science can contribute to them. Local to global knowledge and needs, as well as global-local interactions, are introduced in each component. Upon such foundations, nonkilling educational innovations can build" (Paige, 2009: 82-83). At present we have many highly esteemed military colleges like Sandhurst (UK), West Point (USA) and Duntroon (Australia). With their structures and traditions they are well placed to transform themselves into institutions concerned with Non-lethal Warfare. Perhaps in the not-too-distant future, we might just possibly be sending our brightest and best young people to study at the Duntroon, West Point and Sandhurst Peace Academies (Greig, 2007: 259).

Together with such a feasible, appropriate program of peace education at all levels, in the context of the application of cyber systems for conflict resolution and prevention, what are the "essential prerequisites" which must be fulfilled to achieve "a less blunt mode of communication and force demonstration to have a chance to be effective across the wide range of threats confronting the world today?" (Mandel, 2004: 52). No doubt, to be counted among the prerequisites are additional steps taken to strengthen the international legal order and abolish war, as the Japanese Constitution suggests, which stipulates

that the "right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized." The non-recognition principle is well conceived to become the guideline for the international community to follow in the future (Schlichtmann, 2009).

Unfortunately, "[o]n the political side, the ambivalence of Western governments about the nature of their international responsibilities in a post-Cold War environment" creates serious problems about the legitimacy and frequently also legality of their actions, which obscures the original intent and right purpose. "In comparison to the relatively clear mutual understandings between the two blocs during the Cold War, today's degraded communication system in a global anarchic environment makes it unclear how casualty aversion strategies can work best to signal resolve" (Mandel, 2004: 63) to the adversary. Authors like Jean Ziegler speak out for global justice, and lament the "permanent duplicity of the west" (Ziegler, 2008).

Criticism—Dangers

"The spread of technologies useful for casualty aversion could … trigger a destabilizing new arena of international technology competition," if the UN provisions for establishing a genuine system of collective, common security are not realized. Indeed, "the widespread use of these technologies could accelerate the sophistication of techniques that could be used so rapidly that offense would outstrip defense, meaning that no state would be able to protect itself from intrusion from the outside" (Mandel, 2004: 161). Information warfare is "the only one of the three instruments that is widely available and heavily used by both the great powers and the unruly rogue states and terrorist groups," opening the prospect that "[t]he impact of this situation is a potential stalemate" (Mandel, 2004: 127). Similarly, measures to control and counter activities by right-wing groups on the internet even if implemented, may be circumvented.

Some authors have warned that a contest "to develop expensive countermeasures" could be the result: "As the non-lethal arsenal expands, threatened states will be driven to acquire protective or counter-measures to strategic non-lethal technologies" (Siniscalchi, 1998). It has been argued that "[a]s the United States moves toward using information warfare, so do its opponents; in fact, many say that the more the United States uses cyber-technology as a weapon, the more it exposes itself to cyber-attack by foreign governments, free-lance hacker/terrorists and clever cyber-criminals" (Regan, 1999: A1). In fact "[i]nformation warfare has had considerable effectiveness when launched against the United States by its enemies. Although sophisticated computer network attack technologies may be very challenging for

some, the low-tech information warfare toolkit is essentially open for anyone to use" (Mandel, 2004: 127). It is likely that nonlethal weaponry will "in some instances indirectly trigger a destabilizing new arena of international arms competition," (Center for Defense Information, 1995) unless of course a general world disarmament treaty has been agreed upon and the United Nations endowed with limited but real enforcement powers.

Yet by far the greatest danger is that no steps will be taken to empower the United Nations, i.e. by initiating and embarking on the transition. What would then happen apart from the "impact of this situation [becoming] a potential stalemate," (Mandel, 2004: 127) is that the capacity for generating widespread destruction would be, as is already happening, "gravitating into increasingly less responsible hands" (Garwin and Winfield, 1999: 78) such as powerful international and inner-state insurgents, including terrorist and criminal networks. It is mind-boggling to think that at present, apparently, "[f]or the first time since the emergence of the nation-state, more military weapons are in the hands of private citizens than in the hands of national governments due to the uncontrolled spread of arms" (Mandel, 2002). As "nations are losing their traditional monopoly on military technologies, non-state actors and even individuals are gaining the ability to impose damage on a far larger scale." Also, "[t]he geographical assumption that ties combatant status to a particular physical battlefield, core to the existing framework of the laws of war, is questionable in a world of global terrorism and cyberspace confrontation" (Allenby and Mattick, 2012). Another extremely worrisome development we are seeing is the "eroding of the clear differences between a state of peace and a state of war, creating substantial institutional confusion." There is a clear necessity, "to develop a sophisticated and adaptive institutional capability to recognize critical change as it happens, understand the implications across multiple domains, and respond in ways that are rational, ethical, and responsible," since "technological evolution and concomitant changes in military, cultural, and social domains have rendered virtually all of the fundamental assumptions underlying the laws of war at least potentially contingent." (Allenby and Mattick, 2012) Giving the United Nations a sovereign authority of its own obviously is the way to go.

Critique has also come from such prominent international analysts as Javier Solana and Ian Bremmer, warning that UCAVs, "[b]y lowering the costs and risks of attack, these technological innovations make military action more likely." The authors warn:

> Perhaps the lowest-cost way to undermine rivals and attack enemies is to launch attacks in cyberspace. That is why so many deep-pocketed governments—and some that are not so rich—are investing heavily in the technology and skills needed to enhance this capability. This form of warfare is especially worrisome for two reasons. First, unlike the structure of Cold War-era "mutually assured destruction," cyber weapons offer those who use them an opportunity to strike anonymously. Second, constant changes in technology ensure that no government can know how much damage its cyber-weapons can do or how well its deterrence will work until they use them. As a result, governments now probe one another's defenses every day, increasing the risk of accidental hostilities (Solana and Bremmer, 2013).

Criticizing nonlethal weapons technology some authors think they may "provide an authoritarian state with more means of oppressing and controlling people, and give police more tools for the abuse of power" and to "bolster its own power and influence" (Lewer and Schofield, 1997: 97-98, 133-134) and thus to become an instrument for torturing its own people. "Of course, it is possible to misuse virtually any type of munitions in this way" (Mandel, 2004: 114). What is true is that without measures taken to empower the United Nations, to achieve general and complete disarmament and abolish war, international security will remain a pipedream and the arms race accelerate further, as it has already done after a brief spate of arms expenditure reductions in the final decade before the turn of the millennium. Between 2000 and 2010, world military expenditure has once more increased by about 50%. We must get away from the friend-enemy paradigm that perpetuates international antagonisms and move toward a UN endowed with real powers to enforce world law.

Mandel's critique regarding the present state of affairs, i.e that employing nonlethal weaponry may "foster unrestrained interventionism," (Mandel, 2004: 116) loses its persuasion once the UN transition and Charter Review has been initiated. As soon as that happens, the veto powers will control and decide unanimously, together with the other powers, on the need for enforcement action, if and when the need arises.

The natural candidate to initiate the transition from an armed to an unarmed peace envisaged in the UN Charter, is—because of its history and post-war Peace Constitution—Germany. Without Germany taking action to abolish war it is likely that there will be no progress. Germany today is a peace-loving country. While at the Hague Peace Conferences 1899 and 1907 one nation, Germany, could foil the effort by vetoing the institution of obligatory arbitration (binding international jurisdiction), today, with the UNO and

so many international organizations and peace movements in place, the opposite is true: one nation can trigger the process of the transition, for example by "seconding the motion" of the war-abolishing Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. I expect Germany to play its part toward this end. It stands to reason that in today's anarchic environment policy makers must be aware that "[c]onflicts are … likely to arise or persist when those with the means to prevent or end them cannot or will not do so" (Solana/Bremmer, 2013).

There is a dilemma, however, because the role of the five Permanent Members during the transition, when they will assume the responsibility to see the transition through, has not been well understood and communicated (Schlichtmann, 1999 and 2011). While it is the victorious powers of two world wars who fought against the forces of militarism, nationalism and racism, ideally, during the transition, aspiring countries like Germany and Japan should be co-opted, while India would get a permanent seat without delay. In the process, eventually the EU could replace 'colonial' proxies France and Britain.

In spite of the obvious benefits of nonkilling policies, when arguing in the context of the current, still rampant war system, criticism comes "from both the left and the right of the political spectrum." Right-wing critics argue "that the quest for bloodless war replaces battlefield courage with cowardice and prevents the military from undertaking the concerted use of overwhelming force in foreign confrontations necessary to achieve decisive victory and overall national security." (Mandel, 2004: 2) Again, within the present configuration, critics from the Left argue that "the quest for bloodless war is just a deceptive hypocritical sham, a pretext for military adventurism, degradation of public health" or "a warped ethnocentric justification for saving one's own people while indiscriminately slaughtering others" (Mandel, 2004: 2). The

> accuracy of "smart weapons" does not guarantee the safety of civilians, and it may even tempt field commanders to attempt to hit targets very near civilians. The tactic of "shock and awe" will cause catastrophic damage to essential urban infrastructure. "Collateral damage" is a euphemism for systematic disregard for the medium and long-term public health effects of destroying lifeline infrastructure, essential civilian services, and forcing the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians (Wisner, 2003: 2).

Also, there is "the possibility that, in interfering with military communication and information systems, one inadvertently disables such systems necessary for the survival of the civilian population" (Mandel, 2004: 50-51). On the issue of sanctions the question concerning the "ability of elites to pass on the costs of sanctions to their poor" must be resolved, as "[m]any

suffer under sanctions, but rarely the intended." Enforcement agents must avoid situations where they might "kill militarily and economically without achieving desired results" (Sapolsky and Shapiro, 1996: 122). Thus "casualty minimization deficiency could be particularly problematic in a couple of situations: wartime missions whose goals are humanitarian, … and wartime missions whose goals are simply regime change or decapitation of leadership" (Mandel, 2004: 48). But it is unlikely that these problems will persist once the transition has been initiated, a world disarmament treaty agreed upon, and the United Nations been empowered. Again, obviously, it is necessary to get away from the friend-enemy stereotype and move toward a UN policing status. Paige (2009: 90) stresses

> the assumed realizability of a nonkilling global society requires attention to the well-being of each individual who shares life on earth from birth to death as generations come, intermingle, and pass on. The basic unit of nonkilling political analysis is the individual human being. Organizations, structures, and processes are the product of aggregated individual behavior. World politics is the politics of world individuals. A nonkilling global society depends upon individuals who do not kill. If no one is to kill or be killed, the interests of all human beings must be taken into account.

Questions also persist about "how technology affects the humanity of warfare" (Mandel, 2004: 22). For example, it has been reported that "[d]rones are terrorizing an entire civilian population" in North Waziristan. (Gibson, 2012; Stanford University Report) In view of the historical advancement of weapons technology one must be aware that the "inventive genius of man" may in some ways have "obliterated his sense of moral values" (Fuller, 1998: x, xiii). This development that has given man the power to destroy on a large scale could negatively affect his mental attitude and disposition. "In other words, as increasingly sophisticated armaments increase the technological capacity to achieve military objectives without killing a lot of people, at the same time they may inadvertently decrease the moral desire to do so" (Boot, 2002: 328). The question is: "Will technology be used to make war more humane?" "If we read the question to mean, 'Will technology result in wars that have fewer casualties and less collateral damage?' the answer is yes, almost certainly. If we read the question to mean, 'Will technology result in less frequent wars fought for more *noble* ends?' the answer is no, with an even higher degree of certainty" (Musgrave, 2003: 1). Similarly, Mandel also makes the point: "Advanced weapons technology distances initiators of violence from witnessing the direct suffering of targets, lessening the probability of moral inhibitions entering the pic-

ture" (Mandel, 2004: 22). Again, it is likely that this would change once war has been abolished in favor of a just and equitably disarmed and effectively policed world. This would likely bring the morality back. There are also technical problems because mechanization poses "challenges of its own, such as issues of control, breakdown, and repair," in spite of the evident "potential to advance the bloodless war agenda" (Mandel, 2004: 59).

One thing is certain, "unless we stop killing not only freedom and equality are in jeopardy but our very survival—individual, social, and ecological—is imperiled. We have reached a point where the science and practice of politics must be aligned with the life-supporting forces of society and nature. It is not only good morality and good practicality, but it is also this era's imperative…" (Paige, 2009: 134).

Implemetation and Feasibility during Transition

> *The history of civilization is in large part the history of institutional innovation.*
> *The time has come to set forth human killing as a problem to be solved rather than to accept enslavement by it as a condition to be endured forever (Paige, 2009: 113 and 127).*
> *However, closer examination of certain historical trends and their extrapolation into the future may leave us with some hope that systems of institutionalized trust and collective security may yet emerge in time to head off holocausts and catastrophes* (Goldman 1982: 132).

The question is whether we believe a "nonkilling society is possible" or not. As Paige (2004: 99) so aptly describes: Nonkilling political science must provide "credible security alternatives against lethal aggression at the individual, local, national and international levels". This should include strengthening the United Nations Organisation and its branches. History gives us a clue:

> If Machiavelli can prescribe skills for violence-accepting dominance, it is now possible to work out the strategy and tactics of nonkilling political power. If Hobbes can propose a monster state coercing social peace by a monopoly of violence, new modes of governance responsive to human needs can be explored where no lethality is needed. If Locke can envision violent revolution to displace despotic rule, we can now perceive the strategy and tactics of nonkilling democratic liberation. If Marx and Engels can envision class struggle with violence as the ultimate arbiter, we can now envision processes of nonkilling struggle to realize age-old aspirations for economic justice. If Rousseau can prescribe a social contract based

> upon lethality against violators, and if present leaders continue to speak of violence-based 'contracts' and 'covenants', we can now begin to explore mutual commitments to well-being in nonkilling communities. If Kant (1795/1959) can envision 'perpetual peace' deriving from steadfast adherence to a no-war categorical imperative, we can now perceive elements needed to transform a nonkilling imperative into global reality. If the American political tradition bequeaths a classic declaration of violent independence and a violence-affirming constitution, it is now possible to envision a nonkilling declaration of independence from American societal violence and a new nonkilling constitution. And if Weber can prescribe politics as a vocation that must accept the inevitability of killing, we can now envisage politics and political science as vocations that assume the possibility of liberation from violence (Paige, 2009: 86-87).

So, how can we "move towards an effective and democratic *world government* in which … nations recognise a higher authority on issues of war and peace? … How do we bring about these profound changes that we have been discussing?" (Greig, 2007: 244, 257, emphasis added). Most people may think that

> war is wrong, but it can seem hard to do much about it as an individual. Progress may seem very slow. However, with the huge growth in electronic communications we are also almost certainly more aware than we have ever been of all the efforts for peace (Greig, 2007: 257).

In fact Paige suggests setting up "common security councils and nonkilling intelligence agencies at national and transnational levels [and especially] … at the United Nations level." Initiators could be "nations that rank lowest on indicators of lethality: no nuclear weapons, no armies, no capital punishment, low homicide rates, no arms trade, and so forth." (Paige, 2009: 120) Nations that have a special historical debt to pay to the international community in this regard, or whose constitution stipulates that the country should "serve the peace of the world" (as the German Constitution stipulates) or who are in a propitious position from a geopolitical point of view, should also be able to qualify.

> Nonkilling intelligence agencies are needed, in conjunction with investigative mass media of communication and citizen alerts, to reveal all forms and threats of lethality and to identify capabilities for countervailing public and private transformational action. Nonkilling specialists in diplomatic establishments are needed no less than conventional military attachés or officers responsible for economic relations. Nonkilling cultural attachés seek to build bridges of discovery, mutual learning, and cooperation between all sources of nonkilling well-being in home and host countries. Global Inter-

> net capabilities promise worldwide citizen sharing of common security information with potential for producing concerted nonkilling actions that are not dependent upon conventional governmental, corporate, or media definitions of the situation (Paige, 2009: 120).

The author continues: "Conventional security theory and practice ultimately derive from the threat of lethality: 'I/we want to make it absolutely credible to you that I/we will kill you'." In contradistinction nonkilling security starts from the opposite assumption: "'I/we want to make it absolutely credible to you that I/we will not kill you. And you must make it absolutely credible that you will not kill me/us.' In short, 'We must make it absolutely credible to each other that we will not kill'" (Paige, 2009: 99).

On the other hand it can not be overlooked that the threat and use of force, prohibited by the UN Charter, continues. Has the "advent of the nuclear era" really "reduced the utility of total war," as Karl W. Eikenberry, a former US Army Lieutenant General and U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, and present lecturer at Stanford University, assumes? (Eikenberry, 1996: 109-118). Apart from its "utility," in spite of everything, the predicament of total war is still with us. Indeed, as Albert Einstein proclaimed after the war: "The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe." Total war lingers on, as is evidenced by some of the belligerency seen in Africa and elsewhere. The only way out, it seems, is by embarking on the transition, stipulated in the UN Charter, and empowering the people (Schlesinger, 2002: 88).

> Complementing what may be termed "top down" nonkilling political institutions (for example, parties, public service departments, and common security institutions), "bottom-up" consortia of powerful nonkilling transformational forces are needed. An example is the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), a coalition of peoples with distinctive identities explicitly committed to nonkilling action to influence the United Nations, governments, and other institutions to recognize their collective human rights. … Eventually a powerful global citizens consortium for a nonkilling world, a partnership of women and men, should emerge as a force for universal well-being. Such consortia need to be developed within and across zones in the funnel of killing and in the major problem-solving areas of violence, economics, human rights, environment, and cooperation (Paige, 2009: 122).

As John F. Kennedy wrote to a friend as a young journalist attending the San Francisco UN Conference: "Things cannot be forced from the top … The international relinquishing of sovereignty would have to spring from the

people—it would have to be so strong that the elected delegates would be turned out of office if they failed to do it" (Schlesinger, 2002: 88). This is not at all utopian or far-fetched. With regard to the issue of bloodless and nonkilling policies, the history of conflict and war shows that "technological advances … have on occasion yielded unexpected consequences," (Mandel, 2004: 77) including empowerment of the people. However, we need to be aware and take into consideration that, "contrary to the illusion of precision and calculability conveyed by advanced professional management ... total war [is] … far more intractable to intelligent decision than … expected" (Osgood, 1971: 94). It may be precisely the predicament of lingering total war and the nuclear dilemma that make implementation of bloodless conflict resolution and nonkilling policies possible and inevitable.

Psychological operations, too, can "prevent needless loss of life, needless casualties," (Glaser, 2003) and prevent total war situations where any and all means may be employed to end war (victorious), even if this means a high score in civilian casualties. "This approach may soften the repercussions of war, as such operations can reduce casualties by encouraging opposing troops to surrender, and they can help win civilian support" (Dittmann, 2002: 32). The law-enforcing or aggression-averting coalition of UN police forces will be encouraged "to use every means at its disposal to build up its powerful image in the eyes of its enemies so that foes would capitulate without much loss of life. This 'muscle-flexing'," Robert Mandel observes, could demonstrate to potential law-breakers and aggressors that "resistance is futile because one's military technology is so superior to theirs that any action on their part can be stymied before it is even launched." They would become "painfully aware of the awesome capabilities of specific casualty-minimizing weapons technologies," i.e. precision-guided munitions, nonlethal weaponry, and cyber information and education tools, which would intimidate, caution and restrain potential aggressors. In addition: "Nonkilling common security implies engagement of entire populations at local, national, and international levels," (Paige, 2009: 120) to facilitate the transformation of the Security Council into a Common Security Council possessing effective authority and overall legitimacy. Political scientist Ralph M. Goldman has called this the "critical transition," the aim of which is to set up "the central institutions of conflict resolution and promotion of political trust," (Goldman 1982: 121) required for the effective organization of peace.

Politicians and political scientists, peace activists and researchers must ask themselves precisely "what kinds of institutional changes" are required to bring about the "transition to a nonkilling global society." Because of the per-

vasive nature of the international environment, obviously, the "purposive pursuit of nonkilling conditions of global life portends institutional changes as pervasive in scope to those associated with the global diffusion of contemporary communication and information technologies" (Paige, 2009: 114). It would be wise, besides being proficient, to make every possible use of the already existing legal provisions in international and constitutional law that are meant to and likely to guarantee the desired outcome if backed up by civil society movements, conscientious diplomats (e.g. Stéphane Hessler) etc. This includes following up on the Japanese war-abolishing Article 9 (Schlichtmann, 2001 and 2009).[3] Following up on Article 9 would mean taking legal action to abolish war, and starting a debate in the UN General Assembly and other fora as well as among the general public, at the end of which a (possibly worldwide) vote would decide the issue (Schlichtmann, 2011: 26).

The "prospect of developing nonkilling common security forces" should not be dismissed lightly. This is certainly true "in view of current trends in some military and police establishments toward violence prevention, engagement in lightly armed peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief, exploration of usefulness of nonlethal weapons, and receptivity to training in nonkilling methods of conflict resolution" (Paige, 2009: 120).

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[3] Based on Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution a world-wide movement to abolish war has been launched: <http://www.haguepeace.org>. See also the Global Article 9 Campaign to Abolish War at <http://www.article-9.org>, the Movement for the Abolition of War at <http://www.abolishwar.org.uk>, and the McCloy-Zorin Accords at <http://www.nucleardarkness.org/solutions/mccloyzorinaccordstext/>.

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